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Name: Bell, Henry 
NY SID 
DIN: 15-A-2660 
STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 






Appearances: Christina Myers Esq. 
Greene County Public Defender 
County Office Building 
411 Main Street, 2nd Floor 
Catskill, New York 12414 
Decision appealed: September 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of hold 
to ME date.. · 
Board Member(s) Alexander, Drake 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Letter-briefreceived January 18, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
e undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
"6"''10~-, .A,~fi<',~//). ~~med _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded fo; de novo intervie~ _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview __ Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ te dings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ·~ '/Cf 66' 
I 
Distribution: Appeals Unit-Appellant -Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (1112018) 
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    Appellant challenges the September 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a  hold to ME date. Appellant raises the following claims: 1) the decision is arbitrary and 
capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or 
properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the Board ignored his EEC. 3) the decision lacks 
detail. 4) no aggravating factors exist. 5) the decision lacks substantial evidence. 6) the Board 
failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that the statutes are now 
rehabilitation and future based. 7) the hold to ME date is excessive. 
 
     Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the 
specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  
People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 
1983). Whereas here the inmate has received an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a 
finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not 
live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the 
welfare of society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 
771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1st Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 
N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992).  While 
consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th 
Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).   
 
     Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, the record reflects it also considered other 
appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered.  Matter 
of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018). 
Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, it was free to do so given all factors need not 
be given equal weight.  Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 
156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017). 
 
     The fact that the inmate committed the instant offense while on community supervision is a proper 
basis for denying parole release.  See, e.g., Matter of Byas v. Fischer, 120 A.D.3d 1586-87, 1586, 
992 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Thompson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Guzman v. 
Dennison, 32 A.D.3d 798, 799, 821 N.Y.S.2d 208, 208 (1st Dept. 2006). 
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     The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
    The Board may consider an inmate’s failure to comply with DOCCS rules in denying parole.  
See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d 
Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 
960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 
A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 
343 (2012).   
     The Board may consider a district attorney’s recommendation to deny parole.  Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 
2018); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of 
Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter 
of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).  
    The Board may consider inadequate release plans in denying parole.  See, e.g., Matter of 
Delrosario v. Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016) (concern about reentry 
plans in case immigration does not deport inmate); Matter of Murphy v. State of New York Exec. 
Dep’t Div. of Parole Appeals Unit, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 32825(U), 2010 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 4926 
(Sup. Ct. Albany Co. Sept. 30, 2010) (Ceresia S.C.J.) (denial based in part on absence of legitimate 
release plan). 
    The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Bush v. 
Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed 
results including substance abuse relevant given use before crime); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 
148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for 
substance abuse alcohol related crimes); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 
A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family 
support), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).   
 
    Receipt of an EEC does not preclude denial of parole.  Matter of Milling v. Berbary, 31 A.D.3d 
1202, 1203, 819 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 7 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 822 N.Y.S.2d 481 
(2006); Matter of Romer v. Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 867, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (3d Dept. 
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2005); Matter of Barad v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 275 A.D.2d 856, 713 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 
(3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 96 N.Y.2d 702, 722 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2001). An EEC does not 
automatically entitle an inmate to discretionary release or eliminate consideration of the statutory 
factors including the instant offense.  Matter of Corley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 33 
A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Pearl v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of White v. 
Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006).  Moreover, the Board is not 
required to give each factor equal weight.  Matter of Corley, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 
817, 818; Matter of Pearl, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817.  The Board may deny release 
to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the 
inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not 
compatible with the welfare of society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. 
Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (2d Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 
176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 
N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992). After considering all required factors and principles, the Board acted within its 
discretion in determining release would not satisfy the applicable standards for release.  In reaching 
its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on… The Board acted within its discretion in determining 
these considerations rebutted any presumption created by the EEC and rendered discretionary release 
inappropriate at this time.   See generally Matter of Neal v. Stanford, 131 A.D.3d 1320, 16 N.Y.S.3d 
342 (3d Dept. 2015).   
    The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any 
aggravating factors.  Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 
N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). 
    There are no substantial evidence issues in Parole Board Release Interview cases.  Matter of 
Tatta v. Dennison, 26 A.D.3d 663, 809 N.Y.S.2d 296 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 714, 816 
N.Y.S.2d 750 (2006); Matter of Valderrama v. Travis, 19 A.D.3d 904, 905, 796 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d 
Dept. 2005); cf. Matter of Horace v. Annucci, 133 A.D.3d 1263, 20 N.Y.S.3d 492 (4th Dept. 2015). 
A substantial evidence issue arises only where a quasi-judicial hearing has been held and evidence 
has been taken pursuant to law. If no hearing was held, the issue does not arise. Horace v Annucci, 
133 A.D.3d 1263, 20 N.Y.S.3d 492 (4th Dept. 2015). A proceeding to determine whether an inmate 
should be released on parole is not a quasi-judicial hearing. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 
N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018). 
    The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
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Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
    “[D]enial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New 
York statute.”  Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).   Denial of parole 
is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New 
York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing Romer v Travis, 2003 
WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the 
facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Hamilton v New 
York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is 
arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. Ward 
v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). 
 
         In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.     
      Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive 
Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d 
Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 
133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015).  
    Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the 2011 Amendment and amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) do 
not represent a forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for 
release decisions.  This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, 
considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive 
change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process.  In 
2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs 
principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  
The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane 
v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of 
Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 
985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never 
intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information 
from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 
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amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of 
each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense.  Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The amendments 
also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when 
deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS 
instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  
Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the 
statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied.  
See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d 
Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017). 
 
   In the absence of impropriety, the reconsideration date set by the Board will not be disturbed.   
Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 908, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 
2002); accord Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 831 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 
Westchester Co. 2006) (rejecting challenge to 24-month hold). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
